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Abstract
While other works have explained difficulties in applying ‘international’ guidelines in the field of
regenerative medicine in so-called low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) in terms of ‘interna-
tional hegemony’, ‘political and ethical governance’ and ‘cosmopolitisation’, this article on stem
cell regulation in China emphasizes the particular complexities faced by large LMICs: the emer-
gence of alternative regulatory arrangements made by stakeholders at a provincial level at home.
On the basis of ethnographic and archival research of clinical stem cell research hubs, we have
characterized six types of entrepreneurial ‘bionetworks’, each of which embodies a regulatory ori-
entation that developed in interaction with China’s regulatory dilemmas. Rather than adopting
guidelines from other countries, we argue that regulatory capacity building is more appropriately
viewed as a relational concept, referring to the ability to develop regulatory requirements that can
cater for different regulatory research needs on an international level and at home.
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1. Introduction
Stem cell research is hoped to yield knowledge that can translate
the regenerative properties of stem cells to stem cell products and
therapies. Such regenerative medicine (RM) is expected to extend
and heighten the quality of the lives of large numbers of people
suffering from old age diseases and protracted and incurable condi-
tions. Critical scientists emphasize the importance of understanding
how the cells work in connection with the safety and efficacy of their
use (Bianco and Sipp 2014; Bianco 2014). Knowledge of the com-
plexity of the navigation of the cells and their integration into the
body are crucial. To maximize safety and efficacy, standards have
been developed for scientists to use in their clinical research and
applications. However, regulatory standards can both enable and
hinder national capacity building, partly depending on a country’s
international position: when set high, the cost and expertise required
for catering to high standards can disable progress in the field. Such
dilemmas have frustrated China’s efforts to reform the national reg-
ulation for clinical stem cell research.
This article discusses how some notions of regulatory capacity
building imply that it refers to the adoption of international regula-
tion. International institutions, such as the International Society for
Stem Cell Research (ISSCR), tend to assume that regulatory capacity
building refers to the ability of countries and institutions to follow
‘international’ regulatory standards. Alternatively, critics of hegem-
onic regulatory standards have argued for self-regulation at a
national and lower administrative level (Sleeboom-Faulkner et al.
2016). But countries that find international regulations unsuitable
to their conditions may also experience problems with self-
regulation (Wahlberg et al. 2013), due to competing interests and
clashing regulatory needs at home. This article uses the example of
stem cell regulation in China to illustrate the regulatory dilemmas
faced by a large low- and middle- income country (LMIC), as a
result of external and internal pressures to follow international regu-
latory trends, on the one hand, and pre-existing alternative regula-
tory arrangements made by stakeholders at home, on the other. In
this article, we show why such notions are inadequate and how they
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can be improved upon. We argue that, rather than adopting guide-
lines from other countries, the notion of regulatory capacity building
needs to be regarded in a relational light, and should refer to the
ability to address regulatory discrepancies between the different reg-
ulatory needs on an international level and at home.
This article shows that China faces specific dilemmas related to
its size, geographical differences in opportunities, diversity in institu-
tional structures, and contradictions between the political centre
and peripheral governing institutions. We provide examples of six
types of these ‘bionetworks’ of clinical stem cell research: life science
research networks that embody regulatory norms, which are shaped
in interaction with China’s regulatory dilemmas. The notion of
‘bionetwork’ as used here emphasizes the entrepreneurial nature of
productive life science networks that share certain scientific norms
and regulatory practices with an appeal to health needs. Their
shared activities include networking, lobbying, managing, trading,
and collaboration with scientific, governmental, and commercial
institutions (Sleeboom-Faulkner and Patra 2011). We will show that
a variety of different regulatory orientations have developed as part
of these bionetworks, the most common of which we have described
in this article. As discussed below, the notion of regulatory orienta-
tion refers to the shared normative delineations of ‘good’ and ‘bad’
scientific research and clinical practices underpinning regulatory
arrangements in collaborative networks. By illustrating how these
norms are related to socio-economic and political conditions, we
point out the necessity of adjusting our understanding of regulatory
capacity building. As we show below, it needs to have the capacity
to deal with a variety of regulatory research needs, both on an inter-
national level and at home.
1.1 Standards and regulation
Procedural standards are important to the accurate delineation of
the steps that are to be taken when specified conditions of a proce-
dure are met to ensure high quality final products (Timmermans and
Epstein 2010). Examples relevant to clinical stem cell research are
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and standards and guide-
lines for preclinical studies, clinical trials, quality controls, Good
Manufacturing Practice (GMP), Good Laboratory Practice (GLP),
Good Clinical Practice (GCP) and external review by independent
expert committees. Such regulation is meant to ensure that there is
sufficient evidence for the safety and efficacy of the stem cell prod-
ucts. But the conditions under which the various dimensions of pro-
cedural standards develop, including exchangeability, ethical
acceptability, political authority, financial support, expertise, politi-
cal pressure, bureaucracy and reputation are crucial to whether and
how regulation is embedded in society (Timmermans and Epstein
2010: 72). The development of standards harbours a dilemma:
although flexible definitions of scientific objects can be preferable
from a research perspective (Fox Keller 1999: 136–41), when it
comes to clinical applications, it is important to have procedural
standards in place that link quality standards for final products with
standards for the characterization of stem cell lines (Sengoku et al.
2011). Thus, a method that reproducibly induces the same differen-
tiated cell lines from different cell lines or cell types can be part of
the protocol examined by an institutional review boards (IRBs) or
drug regulatory authority.
Although international organizations, such as the ISSCR and the
International Society for Cellular Therapy (ISCT), and many coun-
tries and regions have developed guidelines, the international,
national, and regional guidelines for clinical stem cell research differ
substantially and are subject to radical change (Sleeboom-Faulkner
et al. 2016). International authority has been ascribed to the guide-
lines of the ISSCR (ISSCR 2008) and ISCT (2015), and many coun-
tries have followed the guidelines and standards of drug regulatory
authorities in the USA and the EU to enable collaborative research
efforts. But in LMICs, such as China and India, the articulation of
‘international guidelines’ with local practices has led to sustained
regulatory dilemmas. Especially in China, life science innovation is
earmarked as a main driver for economic progress, and bioscience
and biotechnology have become key areas for government support
and funding for scientific research over the last decades (CURE
2009; China National Center for Biotechnology Development 2011;
Wang 2011; MoST 2013). Although various sets of regulations for
clinical stem cell research and applications have appeared, major
gaps and questions regarding research governance remain.
1.2 Regulatory development of clinical stem cell
research in the PRC
In China, various sets of regulation have been issued since 2000.
Apart from the ‘Drug Administration Law’, issued by the Ministry
of Health (MoH, 2001)—now part of the National Health and
Family Planning Commission (NHFPC)—the ‘Quality Control
Standards for Clinical Drug Trials’ (China Food and Drug
Administration [CFDA, 2007) and the ‘Interim Regulations on the
Ethical Review of Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects’
(MoH, 2009), regulation directly pertaining to clinical stem cell sci-
ence, has appeared in 2009, 2012, 2013, 2015, and 2016 (NHFPC
2016).
In 2009, the MoH promulgated the Management Measures for
the Clinical Use of Medical Technologies. This regulation classified
a range of new medical technologies and procedures into three cate-
gories where stem cell transplants were classified as ‘Category 3.’
This category of medical technologies involves serious ethical prob-
lems, and safety and efficacy issues that still need to be resolved
through clinical trials. The regulation stipulated that clinical appli-
cations of stem cell technology had to be halted by 31 October
2009, if they had not applied for or passed auditing (MoH 2009).
Although stem cell interventions required MoH approval before
clinical application, for-profit clinics and a number of hospitals con-
tinued to provide ‘stem cell therapy’.
In January 2012, the MoH issued the Notification on Self-
Evaluation and Self-Correction Work regarding the Development of
Clinical Stem Cell Research and Applications (MoH 2012). It gave
stem cell research institutions a period of 6 months for self-
evaluation and self-correction, and it announced that the CFDA
would not accept any applications until 1 July 2012. Clinical stem
cell research and clinical trials came to a virtual standstill in most
laboratories and hospitals of academic institutions, although there
were exceptions, including military and police academies, private
hospitals and some lower-tier academic and medical institutions.
In March 2013, the MoH published three interrelated draft regu-
lations for public comments: Administrative Measures for Clinical
Stem Cell Research Trials, Administrative Measures for the
Research Base of Clinical Stem Cell Trials, and Guiding Principles
for the Quality Control of Stem Cell Research Preparation and
Preclinical Research (MoH, 2013). These draft regulations prepared
the way to regulation of clinical stem cell research and applications
in China (Sui and Sleeboom-Faulkner 2015). It was not until August
2015 that the MoH published the ‘draft’ regulation on clinical
research and applications that involve human stem cells (NHFPC
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2015). It affirmed that stem cell technologies would be regulated as
pharmaceutical products, with the exception of routine treatment
with haematopoietic stem cells. The CFDA published standards and
technical procedures for the collection, manufacture, and storage of
stem cells for clinical use in the ‘Stem Cell Preparations Quality
Control and Pre-clinical Research Guidelines’ (CFDA 2015); it also
specified the required criteria for safety and efficacy assessment in
preclinical studies. Only the highest-level hospitals (tier-three) are
permitted to conduct stem cell clinical trials. Applications for these
trials are to address provincial branches of the NHFPC and CFDA,
and, assisted by expert committees, the NHFPC and CFDA jointly
review the projects. Clinical trials need to be registered online at the
Chinese Medicine Registry and Management System (see Rosemann
and Sleeboom-Faulkner 2016).
Despite regulatory efforts, the regulatory framework has not
allowed clinical stem cell researchers from state laboratories to for-
mally register new clinical procedures and products (Rosemann
2013). Even after the latest reforms, there are still many unresolved
regulatory issues regarding market permissions, international collab-
oration, ‘compassionate interventions’, and the implementation of
regulatory rules for for-profit and other unauthorized stem cell pro-
cedures. Speculations exist about the strategic purpose of regulatory
policies in China: some argue that they serve to stop rogue stem cell
interventions, while others comment that the half-hearted imple-
mentation of regulation aims to allow a wide variety of stakeholder
efforts, such as those of private hospitals, companies and military
hospitals, to forge ahead with clinical stem cell research (Sipp 2009;
Cyranoski 2012). Such policy would have rendered elite laboratories
as casualties of strategic deliberation, as their translational research
is subject to regulatory oversight through the funding they receive.
In this article, however, we are interested in indicating why regula-
tory capacity building has been such a challenge in China.
1.3 Conceptualization
The regulatory development of many countries is largely influenced
by the global dominance of ‘Western’ research ethics. Various theo-
ries emphasize the global hegemony of Western states on life science
industry development and regulatory standards (Birch 2012; Salter
et al. 2015) through the capitalist exploitation in life science devel-
opment (Rajan 2006; Cooper 2008; Petryna 2009), the political and
ethical governance of RM (Bharadwaj and Glasner 2008; Gottweis
et al. 2009; Thompson 2013; Webster 2013;) and ‘cosmopolitisa-
tion’ (Zhang 2012). Such hegemonic conditions could be regarded
as disabling, when standards are costly and designs are alien. But
not all countries follow Western models. In fact, alternative stand-
ards and norms are being developed, and in some countries, a per-
missive regulatory regime is viewed as enabling (Sleeboom-Faulkner
et al. 2016). For this reason, the general focus of global theories on
hegemony, neo-liberalism, and cosmopolitanism need to be comple-
mented by a closer examination of how national policies articulate
both international and local regulatory orientations in the field of
the life sciences. This involves the observation of local modes of
stem cell governance, healthcare needs, and economic and scientific
ambitions (Sleeboom-Faulkner 2016). In this article, then, we focus
on regulatory capacity building defined as the ability to manage and
deal with internal and external regulatory pressures on a national
regulatory policy-making. We show the challenges faced by a gov-
ernment that has to deal with competing sets of regulations, and
argue that these are contingent upon national development
strategies and sub-national economic and political developments in
the field.
In our view, there is no single global force and no single local
pathway that determines the adoption of regulatory standards and
values (Ong and Collier 2008); instead, the particular conditions of
a country (Sleeboom-Faulkner et al. 2016) and local regulatory
developments form both the limitations and the tools of regulatory
capacity building. Rather than view regulatory capacity building as
the ability to adopt regulatory standards that are developed and vet-
ted elsewhere, we use the term regulatory capacity building to refer
to the efforts of agencies and regulators to find pathways that can
organize procedures, formulate guidelines, and meet regulatory chal-
lenges by users in practice. However, when harmonized with guide-
lines of international regulatory organizations, such as the ISSCR,
such regulatory capacity building can lead to clashes with and
between local stakeholders. Although the regulation may enable the
translational research of local elite laboratories, they might clash
with local measures taken by existing stem cell networks that work
with their own informal regulatory standards. In our view, the regu-
latory developments that have enabled local economic and techno-
logical development in the areas of RM, until recently, have pre-
empted the development of what Andrew Barry calls large-scale
technological zones (Barry 2006), thereby stymying the development
of internationally adjusted regulation.
The harmonization of standards and regulation in stem cell sci-
ence are believed to enable exchanges in stem cell research and its
translation (Eriksson and Webster 2008). In technological zones,
such unification takes place in spaces where differences between
technical practices, procedures and forms have been reduced or
common standards have been established (Barry 2006: 239–45).
Technological zones are abstract (not geographical) regions that
share a ‘community of practice’. The networks in this study, how-
ever, are held together and shaped not just by technological knowl-
edge exchanges, but also by entrepreneurial forms of collaboration
or bionetworks (Sui and Sleeboom-Faulkner 2015). Such bionet-
works develop regulatory orientations instrumental to delineating
the rights and wrongs of scientific research and clinical practice. In
the case of China, diverging ‘local’ forms of regulatory harmoniza-
tion in the field of clinical stem cell research have developed as dif-
ferent communities of practice: diverging spaces of regulatory
harmonization have come about across the various bionetworks for
a sustained period of time, directly or indirectly supported at various
governmental levels. Efforts by the national government to
strengthen regulation, aimed at policing and enabling the field, clash
with the norms of established communities of practice. In China,
this has led to a prolonged regulatory stalemate, frustrating efforts
of national harmonization. As we shall argue, this development has
been made possible largely due to China’s socio-economic and infra-
structural diversity, and its political organization: it’s relatively large
size and power concentration in Beijing have created geographical
differences in opportunities; a great diversity in institutional struc-
tures has come about, characterized by contradictory developments
between regulatory policies created by the political centre in Beijing
and those created by provincial governing institutions.
1.4 Method and overview
Regulatory pathways are historical and path-dependent. An empha-
sis on both regulatory capacity building and the entrenched develop-
ment of bionetworks is necessary to understand the development of
the technological zones that have emerged. Our approach proceeds
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from the view that an exclusive focus on how nation states are lim-
ited by global hegemonies neglects locally formed hegemonies and
the multitude of forms of regulatory orientation that exist at subna-
tional—provincial and municipal—levels. A focus on factors under-
pinning regulatory development can improve our understanding of
national regulatory impasse. This article illustrates the various
dimensions of procedural standards using six cases, showing how
uneven conditions and the path-dependency of communities of prac-
tice yield various orientations vis-a`-vis national regulation. The
cases were selected to show the contrasting regulatory and working
arrangements of stem cell hubs that express a desire for national and
workable regulation at national stem cell conferences. Although the
cases in themselves are unique, they represent main organized forms
of stem cell research in China. The six cases also illustrate a variety
of regulatory orientations that have developed in interaction with
global regulatory trends and the development of local regulatory
arrangements. The notion of regulatory orientation, as pointed out
above, refers to the shared normative delineations of scientific
research and clinical practices underpinning the regulatory arrange-
ments developed in bionetworks. Examples of such normative delin-
eations are making pro-active regulatory contributions to steer the
meaning of what is ‘good practice’, creating alternative regulation to
define one’s own ‘good practice’, and toeing the official line to show
one adheres to dominant notions of ‘good practice’. The local and
institutionally entrenched nature of these diverse regulatory orienta-
tions, as we shall see, forms a great challenge to regulatory capacity
building on a national level.
The materials presented draw on fieldwork in China, which took
place from 2007 and 2014. The authors conducted 128 semi-
structural interviews in both Chinese (about three quarters) and
English with experts engaged in various aspects of clinical stem cell
research (policy-makers and bioethicists [18], company managers
and staff [17], stem cell scientists [59], and medical professionals
[34]) in over twenty stem cell hubs in Beijing, Tianjin, Hangzhou,
Shanghai, Changsha, Wuhan, Taizhou, Shenzhen, Harbin, Haikou,
and Guangzhou. In addition, we attended and spoke at various con-
ferences on stem cell science in China and Asia. The relevance of
these numbers lies in the broad basis for formulating the six most
common forms of regulatory orientation, exemplified by six cases or
bionetworks. The interviews were analysed by repeated readings,
thematic content analysis, and the abductive method (Timmermans
and Tavory 2012) though which we identified as significant exam-
ples and explored the concepts of ‘regulatory capacity building’ and
‘regulatory orientation’. As illustrated, the cases exemplifying the
bionetworks correlated with various socio-economic and political
characteristics. As these characteristics can explain the different reg-
ulatory orientations of the bionetworks, we consider them to
express the six most common kinds of regulatory orientations.
The eleven cited interviews with scientists working on RM were
conducted by the first author in Chinese (9) and English (2). We lim-
ited the number of direct references for practical reasons (word
count) and to avoid information that can lead to an undesirable
identification of interviewees. The names of interviewees (the names
shown in the Appendix Table A.1 are pseudonyms), as the focus of
this article is on institutional processes rather than on persons.
However, when we draw on materials on well-known figures that
can be found in the public domain, we have copied the names used
in the publications concerned. We have made sure that the connec-
tions relating our interviews to these publically known individuals
cannot be traced.
The next section introduces six bionetworks, followed by a dis-
cussion of regulatory orientations and why the notion of regulatory
capacity building needs to be relational in order to be effective
(Table 1).
2. Bionetworks and the formation of
technological zones
The bionetworks described in this section exemplify the most com-
mon types of communities of clinical stem cell research practice and
have developed their own regulatory orientation. As discussed
below, the locally entrenched bionetworks develop particular ‘tech-
nological zones’ across geographical boundaries. This makes regula-
tory harmonization particularly challenging.
2.1 Beijing’s Chinese academy of medical sciences: elite
institutions close to power
The case of the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences (CAMS)
exemplifies a bionetwork close to central power. It relies heavily on
state support, and illustrates how the state has affected its standards
of protocol creation, safety, and efficacy. CAMS is a leader in immu-
nology, and pioneers foetal stem cell research (Eurekalert 2009).
Professor Zhao Chunhua leads research on clinical applications of
haematopoietic stem cells, complemented with what are controver-
sially known as bone marrow-derived mesenchymal stem or stromal
cells (BM-MSC) (cf Bianco 2014). Zhao was the first in China to
receive support from the State Food and Drug Administration
(SFDA) (the current China Food & Drug Administration [CFDA])
to start a clinical trial for patients with graft-versus-host disease
(GvHD).
In 2003, when Zhao first asked permission to use BM-MSC in a
clinical trial, no clear guidelines were available for the use of alloge-
neic cells, defined by the CFDA as Grade-3 new drugs in need of
research review. Zhao’s group provided regulators with basic
explanations of the procedures, and helped create the regulation
that gave them permission to go ahead with the BM-MSC trial in
patients with GvHD in 2004 (interview Cha, also see Chen 2009).
In December, Zhao began to collaborate with another CAMS team
in Tianjin, which had access to patients in the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) 307 Hospital (People’s Daily 2005). In 2006, Phase II
of the GvHD clinical trial commenced, but in 2009, when Phase II
was close to finishing, the then-SFDA put a general halt to clinical
stem cell applications. Nevertheless, Zhao was able to continue
recruitment for clinical trials for biliary cirrhosis (ClinicalTrials.gov
2016a), and for GvHD, in collaboration with CAMS, Zhejiang
University and various military hospitals, which are regulated sepa-
rately (ClinicalTrials.gov 2016b). In 2012, Zhao’s study was the
first ‘pilot’ case to get permission to conduct clinical trials to test the
new regulatory system (interview Cai).
Being an elite institute close to the corridors of power has shaped
the regulatory orientation of CAMS through both its dependence
and influence on state power. Thus, it has received substantial state
support. For instance, in 2004, the Ministry of Science and
Technology (MoST) invested some 40 m RMB (then US$ 4.8 m) into
the research (People’s Daily 2005; Chen 2009). At the same time, it
could help create the regulation from which its own research would
benefit, and it had access to a network of hospitals and state sup-
ported academies. Most elite laboratories of well-known academies
and universities receive state funding through which they are tied to
state policies. Such elite laboratories usually develop a regulatory
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orientation of toeing the official regulatory policy-line. However, by
being so close to state power, this bionetwork was able to work pro-
actively by contributing to regulatory developments.
2.2 The Tianjin’s stem cell cluster: stem cell industries
straddling elite research institutes and private
companies
The entrepreneurial cluster around Tianjin Municipality exemplifies
the hybridization of state-supported higher educational institutions
that have been able to attract private funding. Such clusters combine
funding received from state institutions, local governments, and pri-
vate companies. Their institutional complexity provides them with
the leverage to carve out developmental pathways that are not
always supported by the central government. The hybrid cluster
illustrates the state’s challenges of implementing national standards
of safety, efficacy, and ethics. In 2000, Tianjin set up the National
Stem Cell Engineering (NSCE) Industrialization Base, where its
research centre developed a technological platform (2002), which
was to serve the development of the life sciences. Professor Han, a
successful scientist who spent 11 years in Paris, was asked to run the
famous Institute of Hematology (IH) of the Chinese Academy of
Medical Sciences (CAMS) /Peking Union Medical College (PUMC).
The IH has received major funding from the state (IH 2014), and
from private sources for the construction of buildings in the TEDA
development zone. Han co-created the company Union Stem Cell &
Gene Engineering (USCGEN), and, together with Zhao Chunhua set
up the Tianjin Umbilical Cord Blood Bank in 2001. The local
government invested over 10 billion RMB in the Tianjin Huayuan
Hi-tech Park, where the Tianjin UCB was established. Claiming to
meet international standards, it obtained a license from the MoH
(IH 2014).
Under Han’s direction, 50-odd hospitals in Tianjin started send-
ing umbilical cord blood (UCB) to the bank. Now USCGEN man-
ages and owns the entire process of UCB collection and research:
recruitment, banking, cryopreservation, clinical application of stem
cells, R&D, manufacture, and the distribution of monoclonal anti-
bodies and gene chips. In June 2002, USCGEN set up the University
for Pregnant Women to persuade couples to donate UCB (Union
Stem Cell 2014). With the support of the National Development
and Reform Commission and the Tianjin City Government, the Cell
Product National Engineering Research Center was set up in 2004.
In the same year, however, Han used his shares from USCGEN to
establish Tianjin Amcell Gene Engineering Co., Ltd., producer of
human UC-MSCs, adipose-derived MSCs, placenta-derived MSCs,
and amniotic membrane-derived MSCs. Its projects are financially
supported by Tianjin City, and backed by research in the IH. In
January 2007, Han also set up Hanshi or Huaxia Ganxibao
Lianmeng (translated as ‘The Beijing Health and Biotech Group’),
which specializes in placenta UCB banking (HanShi 2011). In 2008,
Tianjin City UCB Bank and the China Bone Marrow bank linked up
with Tianjin Xiehe hospital, which was opened in May 2007, and
started to specialize in stem cell transplantation and genetic diagno-
sis in 2008. It has become a large-scale centre for stem cell storage,
research, and applications (interview Li).
While receiving considerable state funding for the IH and the
Cell Products & National Engineering Research Centre, Han’s net-
work was mainly indebted to local investors. Networking activities
between this industrialization hub, the country’s largest UCB bank,
the placenta bank, and the IH have yielded both wealth and fame.
Han has long-term international collaborations with laboratories in
France and with Amcell, and occupies important national positions
as regulator, as academician, as ‘father of family banking in China’,
as one of the initiators of a licensed UCB bank, and as advocate of
research ethics.
The regulatory orientation of elite institutions that are embedded
in private- and state-industrial organizations tends to be multiple,
whereby international, state, and commercial requirements are
taken into account in industrial decision-making. State elite labora-
tories that advocate ‘international’ procedures question the stand-
ards of the MSC cells banked used in commercial clinical
applications. In their view, only transparency can lead to harmon-
ized standards, which they regard essential to safeguarding their
own reputation (interview Hou). But the dense interlacing of power-
ful state and commercial institutions can be a challenge to regula-
tory oversight. Furthermore, clamping down on such bionetworks
may affect the academic research and industrial services of others,
including those of the state itself, as state institutions can benefit
from the resources provided by these bionetworks, including bioma-
terials, bio-banking, and processing services.
2.3 The military and stem cell activities: a
separate world
Although China has a diverse network of military hospitals and
research institutes, which can be found in all major Chinese cities, as
one category, they constitute a different world from other medical
institutions because they follow their own regulatory guidelines.
Together with university hospitals, military hospitals are seen as the
best medical facilities in China. But military hospitals have their
own set of rules and regulations for clinical stem cell procedures,
and are overseen by military bodies—separate from the MoH—
which answer to the Central Military Commission. Military
research institutes providing stem cell therapies that are not author-
ized by the CFDA include the Academies of Military Medical
Sciences (AMMS), which offers a cure for diabetes (AMMS 2014),
and Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) universities, such as military
and police hospitals, PLA hospitals (Shizhentang 2014), navy
Table 1. Bionetworks, example, and their regulatory orientations
Bionetworks Example Regulatory orientation
1. Elite institutions close to main regulatory power hubs CAMS, Beijing Positive regulatory orientation vis-a`-vis official
guidelines
2. Stem cell industries straddling elite research institutes and private
companies
Tianjin Multiple regulatory orientations
3. Military stem cell hubs Various Independent regulatory orientation
4. Large-scale Commercial Cell Banking and Processing industry Beike Biotech Double regulatory orientation
5. Regional university-hospital-industry alliances away from Beijing Guangzhou Alliance Split regulatory orientation
6. Enterprises partly dependent on the (distant) state—partly privatized Xiangya, Changsha Compliant regulatory orientation
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hospitals (Intec 2014), and armed forces hospitals (B&D 2014;
Sinostemcells 2015). Its simultaneous closeness to and regulatory
isolation from the state has given the military advantages above
other stem cell enterprises. Despite the new draft regulation of 2015,
military hospitals can continue to provide unauthorized treatment
through arrangement they have with small private clinics, which
continue to operate. The clinics operate on a hospital’s premises and
under its licence (Song 2011; Jourdan 2016).
The military hospitals were early providers of stem cell interven-
tions. According to An Yihua, director of the stem cell transplant
department at Beijing’s General Hospital of the Chinese People’s
Armed Police Forces, Chinese hospitals have been using foetal brain
cells to treat patients since the 1980s. An’s hospital alone has treated
nearly 4,000 patients with neural stem cells since 2003, including
foreign patients from twenty countries (Tam 2011a). Many small
hospitals followed suit. Top tier military hospitals, though relatively
autonomous from regulatory point of view, collaborate also with
international contract research organizations (CROs) in multicentre
clinical trials, such as the collaborative study of a Phase I/II ischae-
mic stroke trial by Neuralstem and BaYi Brain Hospital
(Neuralstem 2014), and with hospitals and research institutes at
home. Both CAMS and AMMS have close research links with the
military hospitals to further translational research. In addition to
state research institutions, there are also private research centres and
hospitals that collaborate with the military by providing cell-
processing services (interview Dan).
In China, the military has a good name among much of the pop-
ulation. The mother of a patient, Zhou was told that stem cells were
like seeds; after being planted on a liver, they grow, divide and
spread, and finally form a healthy liver. The failure of the interven-
tion was published widely and damaged trust relations (Tam
2011a). Leading translational stem cell researchers interviewed,
including scientists from CAMS, regard the stem cells derived from
healthy aborted foetuses as an obvious advantage for China’s
research community. The MoH is aware of this. The military pro-
vides therapies to study their efficacy rather than to earn profits. As
such, the publication of research results at home is thought to be
invaluable as a source of experience with stem cell procedures and
as a basis for making research progress.
The military, due to their exceptional status, have remained
well-financed and well-resourced closed pockets for research and
the provision of what is known as experimental stem cell interven-
tions. They have developed their own regulatory orientation. Their
regulatory orientation is rather varied, but the permissiveness of
some permits applications disallowed elsewhere in China. Despite
the January 2012 Notification (MoH 2012), the military continued
to collaborate with both private hospitals and prestigious academic
research institutions such as CAS, providing them with access to
patients at least until our visit later in the autumn of that year.
Although provision is continuing through private clinics, it is not yet
clear to what extent the autonomous regulatory orientation of the
military networks is being affected by the 2015 draft regulation.
2.4 Beike biotech: cell banking and processing without
observing standards?
Beike Biotechnology was set up in July 2005 by Xiang (Sean) Hu in
Shenzhen. It was initially concentrated on the development and
commercialization of adult stem cell therapies that have been
severely criticized for the commercial provision of unapproved stem
cell interventions (McMahon 2014). But Beike strategically
deployed international standards for biobanking, scientific research,
safety, efficacy, and ethics to maintain its large network.
After his PhD and research on biochemistry and molecular biol-
ogy at the Universities of Gothenborg (Sweden) and British
Columbia (Canada), Hu returned to Zhengzhou University in China
in 2001, where he decided to focus on translational research for
severely disabled patients. Hu soon attracted capital from Hong
Kong Science & Technology and Qinghua Universities (Khayashar
2007). In 2006, the Shenzhen government invested 900k RMB
(US$4 m) into its industrial zone, to which it invited Beike, and, in
2009, Beike opened its Stem Cell RM Industrial Complex in
Taizhou, calling it ‘the world’s largest stem cell storage and process-
ing facility’ (Beike 2014c).
Beike’s work in 2010 with Drum Tower Hospital and Jiangsu
University exemplifies its collaborations in translational research
and clinical stem cell applications (interview Deng) (Beike 2014b).
Financed by Jiangsu Province (US$1.8 million), the collaboration
aimed to develop clinical applications using hUC-MSC to treat sys-
temic lupus erythematosus (SLE), multiple sclerosis (MS), and other
degenerative diseases. Beike provided the facilities, equipment, man-
agement framework, and certain proprietary clinical stem cell tech-
nologies for the project. Nanjing University Medical School’s Drum
Tower Hospital was responsible for administering the human trials,
enlisting 200 patients, while Jiangsu University brought its biologi-
cal research and development resources to the production and ani-
mal study phases of the project (Sun et al. 2010).
Internationally, Beike has also branched out to Bangkok, Delhi,
and Malaysia, and it created a rehabilitation centre in Romania and
invested in stem cell ventures in Japan and Brazil (Beike 2014a).
Beike organizes international conferences, fostering national and
international collaborations (Zeng 2009), and maintains connec-
tions with political leadership. In 2010, Premier Wen Jiabao and
President Hu Jintao visited Shenzhen, where they lauded Beike as
‘the world’s most advanced venture’, although the therapies it facili-
tates have been prohibited since May 2009 (Youtube 2009). Beike
has been criticized for selling ‘unproven stem cell therapies’ for high
fees (60150k RMB, 2012). In 2013, Beike claimed to have treated
over 15,000 patients, of which just over half are Chinese (interview
Tu). Revenue is mainly pumped into the company’s biobanking
branch, which since 2012 has AABB accreditation and collaborative
agreements with provincial hospitals on tissue-bank management
(interview Yan).
Collaboration with local funders, well-known researchers and
hospitals is crucial to Beike’s development of stem cell products pro-
vided through collaborations with provincial hospitals, while indus-
trial areas, universities, and funders are crucial for its biobanking
activities. Its international accreditation and proprietary technolo-
gies have gained Beike credibility, and its research and publications
have helped Beike to build up experience and academic capital. As
Beike’s activities are intertwined with state funding, research and
banking, provincial funders, universities, and hospitals, it has con-
siderable leverage, which it uses to lobby with the committee formu-
lating the 2015 regulation (personal communication, Yang).
Beike has developed various orientations towards regulation.
Although Beike has claimed to adhere to national and international
regulations, for a long time it has evaded them by delegating the
application of controversial clinical procedures to hospitals, which
carry the risks of regulatory violation. On the other hand, Beike has
also been developing its own standards for deciding which patients
to treat and for measuring treatment progress. In this sense, it has its
own regulatory orientation to which it adheres when it can.
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Although Beike is best known for its stem cell banking and process-
ing activities, there are other similar industrial networks in opera-
tion, such as the ‘Strategic Alliance for Huaxia Stem Cell Industry
and Technological Innovation’.1
2.5 The Guangzhou Alliance: university–hospital–
industry alliances
The Guangzhou Alliance exemplifies one of the various university–
hospital–industry alliances that aim to translate RM into clinical
applications, rather than making profit. Other examples of local alli-
ances, financially supported by local industry, have been set up in
Shanghai and Shenzhen. On 19 June 2008, twelve research insti-
tutes, hospitals, and companies involved in RM in the Guangzhou
area forged a collaboration to set up the Guangzhou and RM
Alliance to facilitate clinical applications (Guangzhou Shengwu-
Yiyaowang 2014). This bionetwork illustrates how it has been pos-
sible for a regional organization to formulate its own standards for
safety, efficacy, scientific protocols, and ethics. Six stem cell science
institutes in Guangzhou started developing clinical applications for
the Guangzhou City Large S&T Expert Program (Guangzhou
Shengwu-Yiyaowang 2014). The Alliance, headed by Professor Pei
Duanqing from the Guangzhou Institute for Biomedicine and
Health (GIBH), aimed, first, to further basic stem cell science, tech-
nological innovation, and design industrialization strategies, second,
to provide technological training, contribute technical equipment to
Guangzhou’s development and sharing of resources, and, third, to
develop clinical stem cell procedures.
One example is the collaboration of a tissue-engineering centre
(TEC) with various hospitals in transplanting MSCs into thirty
patients with GvHD, whereby twenty-two of them clearly showed
progress (Guangzhou Shengwu-Yiyaowang 2014). Although the
TEC received funding from the Ministry of Education for basic stem
cell research in 2007, it also received funding from the local govern-
ment in Guangdong for translational research. In 2000, the research
team found that administering BM-MSCs to rats decreases immuno-
logical rejection in GvHD, compared to transplantation of BM alone
(interview Deng). Until hearing about a Japanese researcher using a
mother’s BM-MSCs for her child’s GvHD, and about Osiris con-
ducting clinical trials on GvHD, the TEC team leader had not
planned to clinically apply MSCs. As his university did not have
enough funding for clinical trials, and as the funding from local gov-
ernment was only sufficient for clinical studies, TEC started collabo-
rating with hospitals from the Alliance with small amounts of
funding, initially for 23 years. They planned to apply for a state
license after the basics had been put in place. To the team leader,
this research was not about making money, but about ‘returning the
favor to the taxpayer’ (interview Deng).
The Alliance’s labour division stipulated that GIBH provides the
technology, two women’s hospitals provide biomaterials, the Centre
for Cells and Tissue Engineering, Southern Medical University,
Guangdong Province People’s Hospital, the Third Affiliated
Hospital of the Guangzhou Medical Academy, and Guangzhou
City’s First People’s Hospital provide the clinical research basis,
while Hanshi, Seer, and Guangzhou Huanhuang S&T Companies
commercialize it. The Alliance had established its own rules for con-
ducting research and clinical translation to accommodate patients’
demands and fulfil expectations local investors in stem cell applica-
tions. The Alliance used the following procedure: researchers had to
apply for the permission of IRBs before starting clinical research,
and register the research with the Guangzhou Hygiene Department.
After experimental stem cell research was denounced in May 2009,
the Alliance started to invite SFDA staff as visiting professors to
learn how to conform to the ever-changing standards and regula-
tions, and to coordinate its activities with the SFDA. This would
facilitate future applications for marketing licenses (interview
Deng).
To facilitate clinical stem cell applications with the support of
local governments, the regional alliance developed alternative regu-
lation, formulating its own standards for safety, efficacy, scientific
protocols, and ethics. However, after the promulgation of the
2009 Management Measures for the Clinical Use of Medical
Technologies, it claims to have followed the official line. After the
publication of the 2015 draft regulation, alliance research institu-
tions have started to operate on certified hospital premises, as regis-
tered experimental interventions can be used as last resort treatment
(CFDA 2015; Rosemann and Sleeboom-Faulkner 2016). However,
local governments still exert funding pressures to encourage the pro-
vision of stem cell interventions for GvHD and to start clinical
trials.
2.6 Partly state-dependent enterprises from Changsha:
in anticipation of guidelines
The last case exemplifies a semi-private bionetwork that has close
links to the state, even though it operates largely independently.
Semi-independent research institutions that do not have access to
powerful central or regional institutions depend on the state empha-
sis that their activities follow state rules. Xiangya Reproductive
Hospital’s biomedical research in Changsha also shows prepared-
ness to cooperate in forging official guidelines and it is known for its
provision of training courses, ethics activities, and charity. The
enterprise goes back three generations: Lu Guangxiu, its current
leader, followed in her father’s footsteps, and her son followed in
hers. In 1984, she opened China’s first in vitro fertilization (IVF)
clinic, and in 2003, she became President of the Institute of
Reproduction & Stem Cell Engineering (Central South University)
and President of the Reproductive & Genetic Hospital CITIC-
Xiangya. CITIC (China International Trust and Investment
Corporation) funded the initial commercialization of the research.
In 2004, the National Development and Reform Commission
decided to fund a second national centre for stem cells, the National
Centre for Human Stem Cell Research Engineering (NC-SCRE) in
Changsha, and asked Professor Lu to lead it. The committee
invested 20 m RMB, while Lu had to raise an additional 90 m RMB,
which was partly provided by the Changsha local and Hunan
Provincial governments (Interview Li, 5 November 2012). In 2009,
Lu formed an enterprise, the Hunan Guangxiu Biological Science
Co., Ltd. to build the National Centre and the Hunan Guangxiu
Hospital next door. The case of Lu’s ‘family enterprise’ illustrates
that those conforming to official guidelines change the direction of
their research efforts to basic research, but hope to benefit from state
support in the future.
Apart from the clinically graded embryonic stem cell bank,
CITIC-Xiangya and the NC-SCRE have an umbilical cord bank, a
cord blood bank, a placenta bank, and an induced pluripotent stem
cell (iPS) bank. Preparations for the cord blood bank started in
2008. Although they have both a private and a public UCB bank,
they now want to focus on the public bank to develop clinical stem
cell interventions for patients with cerebral palsy, spinal cord injury,
ischaemia (for diabetes), cirrhosis of the liver, and pancreatitis. The
head of the UCB emphasized that no clinical applications had yet
Science and Public Policy, 2017, Vol. 0, No. 0 7
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/spp/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/scipol/scx077/4675127
by Sussex University user
on 08 December 2017
been made: ‘Patients keep ringing to ask for help. But it would be a
violation of state regulation, and we have no evidence for safety yet’
(interview Shang). Lu and her team were the first researchers to
engage with and publish on bioethics issues in practice. As soon as
the new regulation is promulgated, the Changsha group hopes to
receive funding for their UCB projects. Among their contacts in
Beijing are Zhao Chunhua, who had permission to use BM-MSCs
and Wu Zuke, a famous academician from AMMS, who works with
military hospitals (interview Li). While Zhao and Wu continue their
research, Changsha is waiting for the green light.
Although largely independent, this Changsha-based research
hub, like other state-dependent institutions engaged in clinical
research, needs the support and funding of regulators and potential
collaborators in Beijing (CAMS/PUMC) to continue their clinical
and research activities. Ethics and research authorization are crucial
to their ability to conduct business and to their general credibility.
Accordingly, they are keen to follow official guidelines and regula-
tions; to them, regulatory deficit hampers translational research
activities.
3. Discussion: diverging regulatory orientations
and regulatory capacity building
Global hegemonic pressures have lead governments to follow inter-
national guidelines that may not suit a majority of interest groups at
home (Sleeboom-Faulkner et al. 2016). In China, initial regulatory
reform aimed at policing and enabling the field of clinical stem cell
applications in accordance with international guidelines has clashed
with the interests of pre-established communities of practice. This
led to a prolonged regulatory stalemate, hampering further efforts of
national harmonization. The conditions that allowed this develop-
ment to occur in the first place were related to China’s geographical
and political characteristics as a large LMIC. Its policy of economic
growth whereby ‘some may get rich first’ (Deng Xiaping cited by
Wong 2014) has created the conditions for uneven and unequal
socio-economic and scientific infrastructures. The accompanying
diversity in regulatory orientations is characterized by contradictory
developments between the political centre and peripheral governing
institutions.
The six bionetworks of clinical stem cell research, on the one
hand, exemplify the variety of shared and diverging regulatory ori-
entations in agreement with these socio-economic inequalities and
contradictions, and, on the other hand, reflect the frictions between
dominant global regulatory trends and the development of local reg-
ulatory arrangements. The development of locally entrenched bion-
etworks with their particular communities of practice has made the
creation of an effective national regulatory infrastructure a major
challenge. Local bionetworks have invested in material and intellec-
tual resources, patient recruitment, research networks, commercial
relations, and collaborative agreements with municipal, provincial,
and national governments over a sustained period of time. They dis-
play a range of regulatory orientations in terms of setting standards
for safety, efficacy, scientific protocol, licensing and ethics, shaped
variously through local, regional, public, private, and state institu-
tions (see Table 2).
One of the reasons that make it hard to change the ways in
which clinical stem cell research is practiced in China is their embed-
ding in bionetworks, which feed on local power structures, and the
cross-linkages between the bionetworks. Although bionetworks
operate around the norms and rules shaped by a shared
organizational orientation and scientific practice, they are also tied
with other bionetworks with different scientific norms and regula-
tions. These cross-cutting linkages can be found between bionet-
works across China and beyond. Thus, we saw that Hanshi in
Tianjin was a member of the Guangzhou alliance, Beijing’s CAMS
operated a biobank with Tianjin’s IH; Changsha works closely with
Beijing’s PUMC, CAMS, but also Lu Daopei hospital, which works
closely with military hospitals (interview Dan); and, besides having
links to the cord blood banks of various provincial capitals, Beike
has close links with Sun Yat-Sen University in Guangzhou. Some
bionetworks have myriad collaborations with research institutions
abroad, which may well thrive due to differences in the permissive-
ness of national regulatory systems (Sleeboom-Faulkner and Patra
2011). Standards for clinical stem cell applications co-developed by
local investors, researchers, and the stem cell industry diverge from
official guidelines, and the promulgation of the 2015 draft regula-
tion promised to eliminate these inconsistencies.
3.1 Regulatory implications
The implementation of the new draft regulations is likely to recon-
figure the position and the regulatory orientations of bionetworks. It
is bound to result in unequal access to financial resources, including
state funding and industrial investment. Elite institutions are likely
to benefit, but the new standards and requirements may be unaf-
fordable to those less well-resourced or without state support.
Although the new draft regulation is clear about its requirements for
clinical trials, it is not so about the specification of stem cell lines
and the future of clinical stem cell research outside the new regula-
tory framework. It is unclear whether the clinical use of stem cells
will be permitted for patients without other options and under what
conditions. The Guangzhou Alliance, Beike and Hanshi (interviews
Deng; Tu; Cai), as well as some elite institutes (interviews Li; Dan)
considered such experimental treatments justified as a last resort
option, and all researchers emphasized the pressure exerted by local
funders and patients to develop ‘therapies’. On the basis of former
trends, it is likely that the provinces and municipalities that have
their particular vested interests in patient health and clinical stem
cell products will interpret the draft regulation in a manner that
befits established investment patterns for clinical applications.
Considering that the various bionetworks have developed proce-
dural standards that cater to their own particular ‘technological
zones’, it is not surprising that the national government has been
struggling to articulate a set of regulations acceptable to all players.
The 2015 draft regulation has foremost accommodated the regula-
tory demands of elite laboratories. However, the requirements for
market approval for clinical trials and the conditions for routine use
of pharmaceutical stem cell products in hospitals have not been pub-
lished (Sleeboom-Faulkner 2016). The 2015 regulation no longer
speaks of controlled research trials (Phases I–III) (MoST 2013), leav-
ing open the possibility of adopting a Japanese or South Korean
model that allows conditional market approval on the basis of clini-
cal studies with relatively small numbers of patients (Azuma 2015).
In any case, considering China’s diversity of bionetworks and large
number of medical institutions, a successful implementation of the
draft regulation will require considerable investment in regulatory
oversight.
It is not clear how the regulation affects clinical stem cell practi-
ces of the army and police hospitals, where many commercial stem
cell activities have been located in recent years. As the army and
police hospitals conduct a large proportion of clinical stem cell
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research in China, this may affect the overall development of the
field. Furthermore, it is uncertain to what extent the new regulation
can be ignored or circumvented. The new regulatory arrangements
provide official permission for clinical applications only to the stem
cell trials that take place in qualified hospitals. Although the draft
regulation allows clamp down on unauthorized stem cell applica-
tions (McMahon 2014), its focus on review could leave China’s
trade in stem cell products unmonitored (Rosemann and Sleeboom-
Faulkner 2016). The new draft regulation also leaves open questions
about the international collaboration stem cell community hope to
maintain. The emphasis of the regulation on preclinical studies, clin-
ical trials, quality controls, and independent expert committees cor-
responds with guidelines developed by the ISSCR (ISSCR 2008), US
Food and Drug Administration (US-FDA 2015) and European
Medicines Agency (EMA 2007), but clarity on the conditions for
market permissions, IPR, and the role of foreign research entities in
collaborative research are crucial to attract investors and collabora-
tive partners.
Conclusion
This article began by asking why in China national regulation took
a long time to develop and, even under the 2015 draft regulation, is
still unclear in crucial areas. Rather than just referring to theories
that emphasize the debilitating influence of the hegemony of
‘Western’ stem cell regulation, or concentrating on the ways in
which the government may have tried to enable China’s varied
landscape of clinical stem cell research to develop, we have outlined
some of the difficulties of regulatory steering in China as a
large LMIC. Apart from being subject to international political and
regulatory trends, we showed how the development of procedural
standards is complicated by the existence of bionetworks with
shared and diverging regulatory orientations. These orientations
were shaped in interaction with international, national and provin-
cial governments and local policies financial, economic, and regula-
tory policies.
Although any country’s institutional landscape of clinical stem
cell research may be varied, in China this variety has been allowed
to flourish and to consolidate through local bionetworks—
entrepreneurial scientific networks that share particular scientific
norms and practices—for a sustained period of time. The initial,
only partly implemented, regulatory conditions in this complex
landscape have made it possible for a large number of researchers in
China to forge ahead in the clinical stem cell field through unauthor-
ized clinical applications. Nevertheless, already before 2009, the
number of stem cell scientists calling for tightly controlled regulation
had started to grow; these voices wanted China to take a legitimate
position in the global clinical stem cell research field. In this sense,
China is an old newcomer: its size, the state’s ability to fund state-
of-the-art stem cell science, its varied institutional landscape and its
‘permissive’ regulation (Sleeboom-Faulkner and Patra 2009) had
made China an early starter in the field.
The 2009 regulation was a first visible effort to control and regu-
late the field by the official announcement of the intention to clamp
down on for-profit human stem cell enterprises, a step which started
to have perceptible effect only since 2012. Although the initial devel-
opment of the stem cell field had benefited from the relatively
uncontrolled environment with its diverse range of stem cell
Table 2. Bionetworks, socio-economic and political conditions, and their regulatory orientations
Bionetworks Socio-economic and political conditions Regulatory orientation
1. Elite institutions close to main regulatory
power hubs (Example CAMS, Beijing)
As close to state power, has favourable access to
state funding; is respected; has say in creating
guidelines; under the state’s aegis; interna-
tionally respected; collaborates with private
companies and the military
Positive regulatory orientation, guidelines are
advantageous, and as under close state con-
trol. Pioneer authorized clinical trials and
research. When formal regulatory defunct, it
may receive special permissions to continue
supervised activities.
2. Stem cell industries straddling elite research
institutes and private companies(Example
Tianjin)
Funding access to the state, industry and invest-
ment; for-profit stem cell service provision;
regional government support; international
clout
Multiple regulatory orientation, depending on
the collaborative partner concerned; provides
‘unproven’ stem cell interventions
commercially
3. The military stem cell hubs Plentiful funding and resources; large available
patient pool; trusted by the public and
respected all-round; collaborates with private
companies and state research institutions
Independent regulatory orientation, independ-
ent from state interference (until 2015); major
provider of ‘unproven’ stem cell interventions
and conducts clinical trials
4. Large-scale commercial cell banking and
processing industry (example Beike Biotech)
Lucrative industry providing patients with cell-
related services, which are ministered by col-
laborating hospitals; have close ties and col-
laboration with local governments and a
number of universities, jointly conducting
clinical trials.
Double regulatory orientation that tends to
evade state guidelines and regulation when
possible, emphasizing bioethical principles
such as informed consent, patients’ self-
reporting, patient numbers, and high techni-
cal standards, e.g. for banking.
5. Regional university-hospital-industry alli-
ances away from Beijing(example
Guangzhou)
Receive regional funding (from local govern-
ments, industry) to translate RM into clinical
applications to cater for the growing demands
for RM. Often relatively isolated from Beijing
regulators and power.
Split regulatory orientation. When possible,
adhere to collectively developed guidelines
influenced by international precepts and local
needs, but when pushed follow official
guidelines.
6. Enterprises partly dependent on the (distant)
state—partly privatized (example Xiangya,
Changsha)
Partly dependent on state-funding and partly
dependent on own/industrial funding. At a
distance from Beijing, needs toeing the official
line to sustain itself and linked enterprises.
Its compliant regulatory orientation is follow-
ing, supporting, and advocating the official
line. When state regulation is defunct, activ-
ities in the area concerned are hampered.
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networks, it has increasingly become a hindrance to the field’s grow-
ing cosmopolitanization (Zhang 2012). Thus, the international com-
patibility of research standards, reputation, and ethics became
essential to China’s elite centres’ efforts to merge with technological
zones evolving in the clinical stem cell field, while other bionetworks
developed their own idiosyncratic arrangements in line with the
aims of local investors and incidental national and international
projects. The true challenge China is facing is the double-edged
sword of regulatory capacity building: to create national regulation
acknowledged by potential collaborators at home and abroad, as
well as to cater for the various bionetworks with the potential to
fulfil China’s political strategy as world leader in the field of stem
cell science.
For this reason, we argue that the notion of regulatory capacity
building must not indicate the importation of guidelines from other
organizations or countries. Rather, it needs to refer to the ability of
a country to relate to scientific communities that have been formed
under different conditions. The notion of regulatory capacity build-
ing, then, needs to refer to the capacity to develop regulation that
deal with the regulatory discrepancies between international and
national guidelines, and the different regulatory orientations among
local bionetworks. This means that the implementation of regula-
tion should have enough clout to function as planned in transactions
and in exchanges with both institutions abroad and at home, while
being flexible enough to adapt if implementation is impeded at
home. In China, such efforts are complicated by the entrenched
financial and research interests and regulatory orientations that are
embedded in the various bionetworks, some of which cater to the
demands by Chinese as well as international patients, and others of
which have unauthorized arrangements with powerful (legitimate)
research institutions. On an international level, this means that, to
avoid clashes as a result of global regulatory discrepancies, the
development of new regulation needs to be more inclusive of
researchers in large LMICs such as China.
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Cha Beijing 17 May 2007
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Yang Shanghai 20 June 2014
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